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Abstract | The seniority wage is a pivotal personnel system in the Japanese employment 
practices, alongside long-term employment and enterprise unionism. In the early 1990s, 
after the collapse of the bubble economy and as the recession lengthened, Japanese 
companies adopted performance-based personnel systems. Changes in the wage system 
under the slogan of “transition from seniority to performance” created a wage system 
for “work” (shigoto), a role-based or job-based rather than “job competence” wage. 
According to government statistics, as of 2012, around sixty percent of large enterprises 
with 1,000 or more employees had introduced “achievement and performance” as 
determinant factors of base salaries. The proportion of companies that base salaries on 
such factors as job or role is now around seventy percent. The purpose of this paper is 
to investigate the changes and characteristics of the wage system caused by the 
introduction of an American-style performance-based personnel and wage system. To 
this end, I examine the background of its introduction and aspects of development of 
the performance-based personnel and wage system, and show how they have formed a 
new internal rank system based on results. The establishment and characteristics of pay 
for accountability (role-based pay) as a new wage system to replace the job competence 
wage are discussed, giving special attention to the Japanese-style division of labor 
within the workplace. 
Keywords | pay for performance, management by objective (MBO), pay for 
accountability, pay for job, pay for job competence
Introduction
 
As a long recession followed the collapse of the economic bubble in the early 
1990s, Japanese companies experienced great changes in the country’s employ- 
ment system, which had provided the backbone of Japanese management. The 
practice of long-term employment weakened as the number of part-time 
employees increased, and under the slogan of “transition from seniority to 
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performance,” performance-based personnel and wage systems such as 
achievement-based pay and management by objective (MBO) were introduced, 
with American-style performance-based pay as their model.  
According to the government statistics, as of 2012, about sixty percent of 
large companies with more than 1,000 employees had introduced “achievement 
and performance” as determining factors of base salaries. In addition to the 
introduction of performance-based wages, the proportion of companies that 
made the “content of work” (shigoto) a determining factor instead of “job 
competence” also increased. As of 2012, about seventy percent of companies 
based salaries on the content of work in certain jobs or trades (Kōsei Rōdōshō, 
annually).
Much academic and field research has been conducted on the performance-
based system used by Japanese companies. In this paper, I focus on Miyamoto 
Mitsuharu et al. (2007), Kinoshita Takeo (1999), and Ishida Mitsuo (2006). The 
study by Miyamoto Mitsuharu et al. argued that “the introduction of the 
performance-based system does not mean the end of the job competence 
qualification system,” based on study results showing that many companies were 
adopting both systems. It highlighted the fact that the wage system, which 
enables the formation of ability and motivates through performance-based pay, 
did not lead to achievement if ability were insufficient. This is a representative 
view that grasps the influence of the performance-based system alongside pay 
for job competence.  
In contrast, Kinoshita (1999) notes that the introduction of the performance-
based system has made it inevitable that evaluation criteria of an employee shift 
from “seniority” to “work.” The evaluation is based on “job, job category, post, 
role, etc.,” or the work of which an employee is actually in charge. The job 
competence qualification system that assesses job execution ability is merely “a 
combination of seniority-based system and meritocracy.” It argues that job 
competence pay, designed originally to reflect the characteristics of seniority, 
was bound to collapse with the introduction of the performance-based system.
Ishida (2006) occupies an intermediate position between the two abovemen- 
tioned studies at each end of the spectrum. Ishida notes in particular the 
introduction of pay for accountability (accountability-based pay, or role-based 
pay) as a new wage system emergent due to the spread of the performance-based 
emphasis in the market and among corporations. The transition from job 
competence pay to pay for accountability, while maintaining the market’s 
importance, is recognized as a key aspect of the Japanese-style performance-
based system.
Ishida’s study suggests key research subjects and issues for studies of the 
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wage system and characteristics of Japan in the current era in that it explicitly 
grants the “person-standard” pay for accountability an alternative to job 
competence pay. However, in the study, the reality of the division of labor in the 
workplace, which is a factor that sustains the personnel and wage system in 
Japan based on the attributes of individuals, is not explained in detail. An 
additional problem is that there is no review of the limits of pay for accountability 
as a person-based wage. It is necessary to examine those limitations as well as 
the significance of pay for accountability as a new wage system.
In contrast stand key Korean studies on the Japanese performance-based 
wage system, including Pak U-sŏng et al. (2016), Kim Chŏng-han and Kim 
Tong-bae (2011), Kim Chŏng-han (2008), and Kim Tong-bae (2008). These 
studies point to the fact that the performance-based personnel system in Japan 
has evolved beyond the performance-based annual salary system to a work and 
job/accountability-based salary system. However, there is insufficient review of 
the content and character of accountability-based pay as a wage created during 
the introduction of the performance-based system. In particular, it is overlooked 
that the accountability of work in the Japanese workplace can be grasped only 
using a person-based standard, as the accountability-based pay is classified as 
job-based pay linked to a work standard. Meanwhile, Kim Hwan-il’s (2012) 
study discusses historical changes in the Japanese wage system, but its analysis 
of the effects of the performance-based wage lacks detail.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the changes and characteristics of 
the wage system brought about by the introduction of the performance-based 
system within Japanese companies. To this end, I look at the introduction, 
background, and development of the performance-based personnel and wage 
system, and examine the way in which it has shaped the new internal ranking 
system based on work. Given its position as a new wage system replacing skills-
based pay, I analyze the formation and characteristics of accountability-based 
pay by focusing on the Japanese style division of labor in the workplace. The 
conclusion summarizes the characteristics of wage system reform, focusing on 
facts revealed through analysis of changes in wage system, suggests implications 
for Korean wage system reform, and predicts wage system development among 
Japanese companies in the future. Research subjects are limited to full-time 
employees of large corporations in which Japanese employment practices are 
most consistently applied, because this study is concerned to explain changes in 
Japanese employment practices and wage systems.
In this paper, to clarify the nature of Japanese wage system related to work or 
jobs, these concepts are clearly distinguished from the concept of the job in 
Europe and America. In Japan, “shigoto” is a common term used extensively to 
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describe work, labor, occupation, achievements, and duties. The concept of the 
job that is commonly used in Japan is also vague. It is a different concept from 
that of the job in the West, which is defined as “split work” with clear boundaries 
(Tsuda 1995, 71-89). As shown by leading Japanese labor economist Koike 
Kazuo (2005), the term “work” or “job” is not distinguished from its counterpart 
in Europe or America, not only in practical research, but also in most academic 
studies. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes and characteristics 
of the Japanese wage system by using the term “job” or “Japanese-style job” for 
the ambiguously defined concept of work (shigoto) to separate it from the 
Western concept of the job.  
The Wage System before the Change: Job Competence Pay and 
the Japanese-style Division of Work 
  
1. Job Competence Pay as a Personal Attribute-based Wage  
1) Seniority Wage
The wage system is a standard for allocating the total sum of wages paid to 
employees and consists of various wage items. The core of the wage system is 
the base salary. The base salary system is generally divided into job-based wages 
and personal attribute-based wages. The pay for a job, which determines the 
value of a job based on a job analysis system that consists of job analysis, 
classification, and evaluation, is a representative type of job-based wage. In 
contrast, a personal attribute-based wage determines pay based on the attributes 
of employees, such as age, years of service, education, and gender.
The seniority wage, which became dominant in Japanese conglomerates 
after World War II, is a typical attribute-based wage. In the seniority wage, 
remuneration is essentially set on a personal basis and a certain work is assigned 
to the person (person = wage [chingin] ← work [shigoto]). In the 1950s, the 
seniority wage was institutionalized in the form of a wage system with regular 
pay raises based on personnel evaluations. Personnel evaluations were not based 
on jobs, but took the form of assessing employees’ traits (Endō 2005, 134-35). 
The seniority wage became a major axis of the Japanese employment system, 
alongside long-term employment and enterprise unionism during the country’s 
high-growth period from the mid-1950s. It was the “male breadwinner 
household wage,” which had a living wage-like character in that it increased 
with age or years of service. 
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2) Job Competence Pay
In the 1970s, as the working population aged and Japan’s high economic growth 
rate slowed, the seniority wage morphed into job competence pay, a wage 
system based on the job competence qualification system as part of meritocracy 
management. Historically, it was established as an alternative wage system amid 
frustration with the attempt to introduce job-based pay under the slogan 
“modernization of the wage system” (Ishida 1985a, 1985b).  
In job surveys for setting job competence qualification levels, ability 
requirements necessary for the job (shared work) were examined. The required 
abilities were classified by types of job and levels of difficulty, and the difficulty 
levels were divided into several classes to create common ability requirements 
(job competence qualification standards) for each class across job differences. 
Job competence pay was determined based on job competence qualification 
levels. In the job competence qualification system, the qualification level and 
position were linked, but not in a one-to-one corresponding relationship. 
Qualification level promotions (shōkaku) and position promotions (shōshin) 
were separated. The evaluation factors for individual ability were: (1) performance 
(an evaluation of actual work); (2) attitude (jōgi kōka: an evaluation of attitude, 
motivation, personality, etc.); and (3) ability (an evaluation of current and 
potential ability for work).1 
The job competence system was the most widespread wage arrangement 
among Japanese private corporations from around the 1970s to the early 1990s. 
However, the introduction of job competence pay did not mean that the seniority 
wage was completely replaced. In many enterprises, age-based pay features were 
established in addition to job competence pay. 
2. The Japanese-Style Split and Job Competence Pay
Jobs in Europe and America, where job-based wages are generalized, are defined 
as “split work” objectively suitable for an individual as derived from job analysis. 
An employee is assigned to a defined job and is responsible for specific tasks. A 
job (split work) usually consists of multiple units of work, and unit work 
consists of multiple tasks (Tsuda 1995, 80-81).   
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the work (tasks) and the “split 
work” customary in the Japanese workplace. In Japanese corporations, split 
1. For the job competence qualification system and the job competence pay, refer to Chung Jin 
Sung, Son Il-sŏn, and Kim Sam-soo (2004, 93-96) and Chung Jin Sung, Yeo Inman, and Sŏn Chae-
wŏn (2012, 130-34).
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work assigned to employees is work (tasks) that spans multiple job classes. It 
differs from the pay for jobs in the West, in which assigned work consists of 
multiple tasks belonging to just one class of job. For example, employee X is 
responsible not only for sales work (a task) that covers job classes from C to E, 
but also for Class a administrative tasks (job class B), even though he or she is in 
charge of sales management (qualification grade V) according to a job 
competence classification. Employee Y is in charge of Class 2 administrative 
work (qualification grade I) according to the job competence classification, but 
in reality, he or she is in charge of tasks that cover Class a and b administrative 
work (job class B and A, respectively) according to the job class, as well as Class 
b and a sales work (job class C and D, respectively). In European or American 
companies, employee X in charge will carry out only the tasks belonging to job 
class E, so he or she will refuse any work in job class D or below. By contrast, 
employee Y, in charge, will ask for a change to a Class a sales job (job class D). 
In Japanese corporations, each employee’s actual split work is usually 
Job classification
E  Sales manager Sales manager: grade V
D  Class a sales Class 1 sales: grade IV
C  Class b sales Class 2 sales: grade III
B  Class a admin Class 1 admin: grade II
A  Class b admin Class 2 admin: grade I
Job competence: qualificationSplit work in charge
Manager X
Manager Y










Note:  A to E on the left indicate job class. The dotted line shows the job, and the solid line 
shows the assigned tasks of the two employees in charge (X and Y).
Source: Tsuda (1995, 86).
Figure 1. The relationship between work and job
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described as work, a job, or a Japanese-style job. It is a concept that is essentially 
different from the job in the West. The heads of divisions flexibly determine the 
division of labor for employees, taking into account the ability of individual 
employees to perform those tasks. Due to the practice of split work in Japanese-
style jobs with ambiguous boundaries, the attribute-based personnel and wage 
systems were formed. In this respect, job competence pay is the same type of 
wage as seniority-based pay (ability [nōryoku]-person = wage [chingin] → work 
[shigoto]). 
As such, it is an important characteristic of Japanese corporations that the 
division of work is performed in terms of tasks, regardless of the actual job. Job 
surveys to establish job competence qualification requirements are in fact task 
analyses rather than job analyses. There is essentially no concept of "the job” in 
job competence pay. Because the job is not specified, ability, inclusive of potential 
ability, is measured, and a related wage is paid for it. 
In the job competence qualification system, it is important to nurture and 
evaluate job execution abilities. According to Koike (2005), the core of Japanese 
business management lies in “the formation of ability through work,” and the 
treatment system for facilitating the formation of ability is job competence pay. 
The flexibility of the division of work and placement promotes skill formation 
while ensuring functional flexibility. Job competence pay, which focuses on the 
ability or motivation of employees providing labor, is a supply-oriented wage 
system that results in value added from increases in ability, and it is sustainable 
under the assumption that a growing market will evaluate this connection 
(Imano 1998, 83-87). 
The Introduction of Pay for Performance and Changes in the 
Wage System
1. The Introduction of Pay for Performance
In the early 1990s, when the bubble economy collapsed and the downturn 
continued for a lengthy period, globalization of the economy advanced, leading 
to intensified competition among companies worldwide. Japanese companies 
faced extremely low profits amid pressure from US businesses, which were 
growing around IT, and Chinese enterprises, which leveraged low labor costs. 
Japanese corporate management faced a huge burden of labor costs, and 
recognized that supply-oriented job competence pay had the characteristics of 
the seniority wage. Institutional reforms proceeded under the banner of a 
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performance-based system in order to modify seniority wages against the 
backdrop of structural changes that accompanied the aging of employees 
(Kuroda 2008, 93-95). 
What is the reason that job competence pay was introduced to overcome 
seniority-based pay and became the seniority wage? There are two factors giving 
job competence pay the characteristics of seniority: the nature of the job 
competence qualification system itself, and the seniority-based operation of the 
system (Iwade 2010, 81; Miyamoto 2009, 31). 
First, the fact that the job competence qualification system was based on the 
qualification criteria of the ability (potential ability), which is an attribute of an 
employee, the separation of position promotions and qualification-level 
promotions (shōkaku), and the minimum (standard) number of years of service 
for qualification promotions were factors of the seniority nature of the system 
itself. These factors can be said to have been designed based on conventional 
Japanese-style employment in that regular pay raises (shōkyū) were possible due 
to the advancement of seniority.  
Second, personnel evaluation, which is the core of the operation of the job 
competence qualification system, was essentially an ability assessment, as an 
evaluation of job execution ability, and it was also inevitably an experience 
evaluation. The promotion of internal qualifications was also likely to be an 
experience evaluation because the minimum period of stay and service was set 
and considered. Specifically, the evaluation criteria that were actually important 
in individual evaluations were attributes and ability. The ability evaluation 
focused on potential ability rather than current ability. In essence, it was bound 
to be a seniority evaluation, and regular pay raises based on personnel evaluations 
were prone to becoming automatic pay increases.
As a result, before the introduction of the performance-based system, 
Japanese companies had already lost the job competence qualification system, 
and job competence pay virtually became seniority-based pay. The burden of 
labor costs that resulted became the most important background for the intro- 
duction of the performance-based system. A major weakening of labor unions 
enabled the introduction of performance-based pay without opposition.   
Performance-based personnel management can be defined as “a personnel 
system that reflects visible output (performance) more than input, such as 
ability or effort reflected in personnel evaluations or treatment, to enlarge the 
differences in evaluations and to enhance the motivation of the employees 
(especially outstanding performers).” Performance-based pay is a reward system 
utilized under performance-based personnel systems (Umezaki and Keizer 
2016, 2). In the US, pay for performance was introduced to determine wages 
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according to assessments of individual achievements on the premise of job-
based wages. MBO was permitted in achievement evaluations (Kinoshita 1999, 
80-90). 
The performance-based pay system that was introduced at Fujitsu in 1993 
led to wage reforms at leading companies such as Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Company (Takeda Yakuhin Kōgyō) and Kao corporation in the late 1990s. In 
the first half of the 2000s, as the economic recession became prolonged, 
performance-based wages were introduced actively at large corporations with 
the aim of reducing labor costs or making them into variable costs to revive 
businesses (Yamamoto 2006, 63-66). 
In Japan, performance-based pay was introduced at the individual enterprise 
level based on the existing attribute-based wage system (job competence pay). 
Although it was not clearly defined in advance, there were many cases in which 
performance evaluation (achievement assessment) and MBO were used as they 
were based on the model of performance-based pay from the US. In addition, 
reductions in, or terminations of, age-based pay were implemented. 
Initially, performance evaluations were introduced primarily in the form of 
annual salaries. The annual salary system was introduced in the early 1990s for 
management positions at many companies including Fujisawa Pharmaceuticals, 
Tokyo Gas, and Honda, as a pioneering measure of performance-based pay. The 
salary consists of base salary and performance salary. The performance salary 
that can be called performance-based pay is increased or reduced according to 
annual achievement evaluations. Revisions of seniority-based wages were 
sought with performance salaries (performance-based pay) that changed 
annually. A fairer and more convincing evaluation system was required with the 
introduction of the annual salary system, and MBO was introduced to meet this 
objective (Arakawa 2005, 15-17). 
2. Changes in the Wage System  
1) Formation of the Wage System Based on the Japanese-Style Job 
In MBO management, a person and his or her supervisor meet at the beginning 
of the year to set targets for the year in advance, and after the end of the year, a 
performance evaluation is carried out on the basis of the achievement of 
objectives, determined through another interview. In Japan, problems arose 
because MBO evaluations were introduced based on the job competence pay of 
employees’ attribute standards. Unlike in the case of US job-based pay, it was 
difficult to set the objectives themselves because job descriptions were not 
clearly defined. In the objective-setting process, the disparity between the 
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qualification grade and the job level which were inherent in the job competence 
qualification system became apparent. It was a reversal of treatment and job 
level, meaning the objectives of an employee with a higher job competence 
qualification were set lower than those of a lower-grade employee.
With the introduction of MBO, as it was impossible for job competence pay 
to coexist with the performance-based system, many companies in Japan 
adopted an internal ranking system based on jobs (work: shigoto) instead of the 
job competence qualification system. Figure 2 shows the relationships among 
job execution ability, job, and performance. Job execution ability is identified as 
an input in terms of human requirements to carry out a job, and performance is 
determined by output. There is a process for performing a job between those 
two aspects, and it is the job that defines the content of that process. Regarding 
results or outcomes as performance, it is clear that they have closer relationships 
with the jobs that define the processes rather than the job execution ability as an 
input. In this sense, a job can be a reasonable indicator of performance (Suda 
2016, 29-39; Umezaki and Keizer 2016). 
It can be said that there is a logical inevitability in setting jobs as the standard 
for performance-based wages. In response to this necessity, the wage system 
created in Japanese companies is Japanese-style job-based wages such as 
accountability-based (role-based) or job-based pay. In a pioneering case, Fujitsu 
introduced the MBO system and an annual salary system at the managerial level 
in 1993; however, the incentive was distorted and teamwork was hindered 
afterwards due to self-determined and low-level objective setting. In response to 
this, position-based pay (a type of job-based pay) was introduced, while 
performance evaluations were improved to assess actions leading to performance 
and current ability, not simply short-term performance (Jō 2004; Yasuda 2007). 
According to Endō (2016, 31-32), Japan’s representative labor use organization, 
the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations (Nihon Keizai Dantai 
Rengōkai), proposed the introduction of accountability-based pay or job-based 
pay (range rate) as an alternative to job competence pay in 2002.
Source: Suda (2016, 29).
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2) The Types and Reality of Wage System Change
Changes in the wage system since the introduction of performance-based 
personnel policies vary among companies, but can be broadly classified into the 
following three types.2
 
A.  Strengthening the performance-based element while maintaining the job 
competence qualification system. 
B.  Basing the accountability ranking system on the scale of the accountability (or 
position) that an individual is responsible for, and establishing the pay for 
accountability (role-based pay) as the new base pay according to the scale of 
accountability.
C.  Converting the criteria for classification into a job title to determine base pay 
based on the value of the job (job score) (job-based pay = Japanese-style job-
based pay).
Type A is not a new wage system because it strengthens job competence pay 
as a wage of ability. It diminishes the seniority element of wages, tightens 
assessment, restrains automatic pay raises, or introduces performance-based pay 
(achievement-based pay) into bonuses, thereby widening the gap among 
individuals and divisions. This type of arrangement was mainly implemented 
when the bubble economy sentiment lingered in the early 1990s, which was the 
initial phase of the introduction of performance-based system. However, as the 
economic recession continued, the business environment deteriorated consi- 
derably from 1998, and not merely the strengthening of the ability-based system, 
but rather the end of the ability-based system was discussed. Among these, an 
alternative wage system based on jobs was sought (Kinoshita 1999, 123). 
The newly formed wage systems through the introduction of performance-
based systems are Types B and C. It is the main achievement of the performance-
based wage that a new wage system was formed based on the accountability 
(role) or job of which an employee is in charge, not the individual ability, to 
overcome the seniority-based system.  
According to a survey conducted by the Japan Productivity Center (Nihon 
Seisansei Honbu), changes in the wage system among Japanese companies are 
shown in figure 3. In the survey, accountability and job-based pay are not 
divided by type. Overall, rapid changes were made until 2007, and the model 
has been stable since. 
First, in terms of managerial positions, the introduction rate of account- 
ability and job-based pay in 2016 was the highest, at 74.4 percent. The rate of 
2. A summary of Nakashima (2008) and Ishida (2006).
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increase remained steady until 2007, when it reached 72.3 percent, showing a 
constant rate of more than seventy percent since then as a new wage system. In 
2016, the introduction rate of job competence pay was 66.9 percent. In the 2007 
survey, the figure was 74.5 percent, which has since dropped to less than seventy 
percent. Conversely, age and service-based pay (seniority wage) fell from 33.5 
percent in 2007 to less than thirty percent in later years, reaching 24.8 percent in 
the 2016 survey.
Next, considering general (non-managerial) jobs, the introduction rate of job 
competence pay has been stable at around eighty percent recently. In 2016, it 
was 82.7 percent. The introduction rate of accountability and job-based pay 
rapidly increased in the 2000s and reached 56.7 percent in 2007. It then moved 
toward the high-fifty percent range, and it was 56.4 percent in 2016. Meanwhile, 
the introduction rate of age and service-based pay declined quite consistently 
during the survey period. In the 2016 survey, it was just 49.6 percent. 
As shown above, accountability and job-based pay is becoming entrenched 
in management positions that had the highest introduction rates already at the 
end of the 2000s. In the case of general positions, the introduction rate is 
moving steadily in the high-fifty percent range and is becoming an influential 
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Source: Nihon Seisansei Honbu (2016, 16).
Figure 3. The introduction of the wage system 
(b) General
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3. Reduction of the Wage Gap among Age Groups  
Figure 4 shows the age-wage trend curve for a 1,000-employee enterprise in 
which seniority wages are typical. The upper figure is the curve for male and 
female employees, and the lower figure is the curve for males. The index is 
based on the size of the scheduled wage in age groups with the amount earned 
by the twenty-five-to-twenty-nine-year-old age group as 100. There is no change 
in that the peak is in the fifty-to-fifty-four-year-old age group, but the rate of 
increase slows as it approaches the peak age group. Compared with 1990 and 
2000, the wage gap among age groups was narrowing in 2010 and 2015 as the 
rate of increase falls in the broad age range of thirties and fifties. It can be said 
that the degree of seniority has decreased. Although the figure is not detailed, 
the reduced degree of seniority can be found in the age-wage curve and the 
service-wage curve for education levels as both bachelor’s degree or higher and 
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Note: The upper figure is male and female, and the lower figure is male.
Source: Rōdō Seisaku Kenkyū-Kenshū Kikō (2017, 43).
Figure 4. Age-wage trend curve (male: large enterprise with more than 1,000 employees) 
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holders or higher, the gap is remarkably reduced (Rōdō Seisaku Kenkyū-Kenshū 
Kikō 2017, 45-47).3   
The Pay for Accountability System and Its Key Features  
1. The Accountability Ranking System and Accountability Evaluation  
The accountability ranking system is an internal ranking arrangement that 
classifies employees’ ratings based on the jobs and scale of accountability (split 
work) for which each individual employee is responsible within a business 
organization. The accomplishment (achievement) of goals set according to the 
accountability (yakuwari: role) is reflected in the treatment. MBO is used in 
personnel evaluations.4 
Table 1 compares the main content of the accountability ranking system with 
the job class system. In the accountability ranking system, roles are identified as 
role responsibilities (performance responsibilities) that are primarily required 
for positions by examining the assigned tasks (split work) for each position, 
such as a director or a manager. It does not involve a job analysis procedure, as 
such. Role responsibilities are set out in such a way that each employee has to 
accomplish a certain level of business performance (value added), and each 
individual’s role is defined in the form of a general role. A “role statement” is 
created for each position.  
It is important to note that the core concept of accountability (role) is based 
on the same premise of split of work as that in the conventional job competence 
pay system. Nevertheless, split work straddling multiple job classes is assigned to 
individual employees at the task level. Therefore, although the accountability 
ranking system takes the form of determining roles based on the work (shigoto) 
or job involved, it is actually based on the position for which an employee is 
responsible within the organization. 
The scale of accountability is determined based on the following formula: 
3. The effect of the performance-based system on the age-wage curve and the wage gap among age 
groups is also confirmed in a study by Tsuru, Abe, and Kubo (2005), which quantitatively analyzed 
three companies that had revised their wage systems. According to the study results, the revision 
of the wage system worked to reduce the incline of the age-wage curve. After the revision, the 
impact of personnel evaluations and ratings on wage decisions also increased. 
4. The English term for “yakuwari” (role) is “accountability” or “mission.” Accountability ranking is 
described using various terms, such as “position rating,” “title (shokkai) rating,” and “mission 
standard.” Hereafter, refer to Ishida (2006), Nishimura (2016), Iwade (2010), and Hirano (2010), 
unless otherwise noted. 
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Contribution to value added = performance x individual scale of accountability. 
In this scheme, the larger the role of the split work involved a position, the 
greater the contribution of value added. Market and value added are that much 
more important. The scale of accountability is determined by an accountability 
Table 1. Comparison of the job class system and the accountability ranking system  
Job class system Accountability rank system 
Definition -  A ranking system that 
evaluates the scale of each job
-  A ranking system that evaluates the 
role’s scale of accountability for each 
job (split work)
Split work - Job 
  ·  Work within the same job 
class to which the job belongs 
-  Flexible assignment of tasks that 
belong to multiple job classes
․ Split work identified at the task level
Method -  It is assumed that there is a 
clear definition of the job
  ·  Job analysis performed to 
prepare a detailed job 
description for each job 
regarding its content and 
required performance
-  The value of each job is scored 
based on a comprehensive job 
evaluation, dividing the scores 
to establish the job class
-  Based on the job (split work) of each 
position (job description is not written 
after job analysis)
  ·  Accountability of split work 
investigated and defined in the form 
of a general role (role statement 
written for each position)
  ·  Role typically defined by actions such 
as work progress or delegation
-  Value of the role scored by 
accountability evaluation, and 





-  Upgrades and downgrades are 
made when an employee is 
moved to a higher- or lower-
value job
  ·  There is no upgrade or 
downgrade as long as the 
employee remains in the 
same job
-  Upgrades and downgrades are made 
when scale of accountability grows or 
diminishes
  ·  Representative case is when 
accountability expands or shrinks due 
to movement
  ·  Even if an employee does not move 
and engages in the same job (split 
work), upgrades may take place if 
accountability is increased or 
advanced
Wage - Job-based
  ·  Emphasis on demand side of 
labor
  ·  Job-based wage 
- Accountability-based
  ·  Emphasis on demand side of labor
  ·  Person-based wage
Source: Iwade (2010), Tsuda (1995), Ishida (2006), and Imano (1998).
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evaluation. Role responsibility (performance responsibility), authority, and 
difficulty are the main criteria for evaluation, with role responsibility at the core. 
The result of accountability evaluations on the split work of each individual’s 
position is quantified as an accountability score. Accountability scores are 
Table 2. Accountability criteria in the accountability ranking system (sales)
Accountability 
grade  Post Accountability criteria
M3 Director
As chief executive of all sales teams, he or she conducts 
broadly comprehensive judgments and is in charge of 
negotiating with stakeholders such as business customers. 
Creates profit for the enterprise.
M2 Branch chief
With about ten subordinates, he or she formulates strategies 
and implements plans based on the policies of the 
management or the director. Assigns actions of the 
organization’s members according to a plan and performs the 
tasks of the entire branch. Manages the improvement of 
organization members’ motivation.
M1 Section chief
Assists the branch chief and carries out his or her goals, 
conducts the tasks of the team, and provides guidance and 
supervision for subordinates. In the absence of the branch 
chief, he or she also plays the role of deputy.
E4 Team leader
He or she is capable of forming new plans based on his or her 
own experience, ability, and creativity, and can make effective 
suggestions for sales to existing customers. As a leader of a 
team, he or she actively conducts guidance and sales 




Can make self-judgments regarding new sales and accurate 
suggestions in consultations. In addition, he or she can 
provide advice and counseling for team juniors internally.
E2
In accordance with the instructions of the supervisor or 
senior, he or she can acquire new contracts, inquire about 
companies, and carry out orders and suggest tasks. He or she 
can also receive news by contacting acquired customers 
about once every two months.
E1
Acquire contracts by calling companies according to the 
supervisor or senior's instructions, and accompany them to 
conduct consultations. He or she can report formally to 
supervisors on a daily basis.
Source: Nihon no Jinjibu (2013). 
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configured as accountability grades by scoring at certain levels. Normally, the 
number of accountability grades is set lower than the number of job competence 
grades. 
Table 2 shows an example of accountability criteria for accountability grades 
adjusted across jobs (split works) involving sales. In the case of a typical 
employee, the ability factor remains; however, for management positions, the 
accountability criteria are set according to actions such as work progress or 
delegation rather than job execution ability.
Upgrades and downgrades in roles are made when accountability expands or 
diminishes. Typically, when the split work (job) of a position is changed due to a 
personnel transfer (idō), the role is scaled up or down, resulting in a change to 
the grade corresponding to the scale of accountability. Even if an employee is 
engaged in the same job (split work) without moving position, there may be an 
upgrade if their accountability becomes larger or more advanced. In the 
opposite case, downgrades may result. Conversely, if the same role is taken in 
the same job, there cannot be upgrades or downgrades.  
2. Pay for Accountability  
Generally, there are two types of pay for accountability (role-based pay): role-
based pay of a fixed sum (a fixed sum per grade); and role-based pay per zone 
(in which pay raises are tabulated by zone). Under role-based pay of a fixed sum 
arrangement, there is a single wage rate for each grade, so automatic seniority 
pay raises are not possible as long as the grade remains the same. In a role-based 
pay per zone system, pay raise tables are designed so that regular pay increases 
can be suppressed as much as possible by “policy line.”5 
Typically, role-based pay per zone systems involve a pay raise table featuring 
zones as shown in table 3. Wages are set in ranges according to accountability 
grades, and within the same grade, wages are divided into four zones to set them 
further in ranges. For example, the wage level in Zone 3 of grade IV is more 
than 181,300 yen and less than 210,000 yen per month. Let us assume that the 
wage of an employee is at a certain level in Zone 3 – for example, 195,000 yen. 
The amount of next year’s pay increase is determined by an assessment of the 
individual’s performance that year. If the employee gets a grade S rating, he or 
she will obtain a pay raise of 5,000 yen and receive 200,000 yen, and if the 
5. The combination of these two types of arrangements varies from company to company. In some 
cases, wage tables are constructed using the two types, and in some cases, they rely only on a fixed 
sum per grade system. In addition, there are cases in which a wage table consists only of pay raises 
per zone. For explanation of zone pay raises, refer to Nishimura (2016, 24-29). 
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employee gets a grade E rating, a pay cut of 4,500 yen will be made.
Table 4 shows the principle of pay raises within grades under the 
accountability ranking system. The vertical axis indicates the wage zone of the 
previous year, and the horizontal axis (S~C) shows the rating obtained as a 
result of personnel evaluation (performance evaluation) this year. For example, 
in the case of Zone 1, at the lowest level, a pay raise for a C rating is zero yen, 
but pay raises are made within the remaining elements of the evaluation. 
Conversely, in Zone 4 of the highest level, last year’s wage is maintained only 
when an S rating is obtained. All other ratings result in pay cuts. 
It can be noted that the lower the zone, the more generous the pay increase, 
and the higher the zone, the stricter the pay raise. As long as an employee 
remains in the same grade (rank) for a long period, the wage of each individual 
converges to the median level. This is because the policy line, which is a policy 
Table 3. Accountability ranking and pay for accountability (Unit: yen) 
Class
Zone (wage level  
= accountability-based pay  
= base pay) (sum)
Performance-based pay (sum)















Zone 3 More than 181,300
Less than 
210,000 -4,500 0   5,000
Zone 2 More than 130,000
Less than 
181,300     300 5,400   8,000
Zone 1 More than 80,000
Less than 




Note:  Although the table summarizes the results of the survey, the absolute figures are 
assumptions.
Source: Nishimura (2016, 28).
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standard wage, is set in the design of the pay raise table. In the table, the wage 
level at the border between Zone 2 and Zone 3 is the policy line. 
3. Personnel Evaluations
 
As shown previously, in the accountability ranking system, the larger the scale 
of accountability and the better the performance, the greater the contribution to 
value added. In personnel evaluations, performance evaluations are conducted 
based on accountability grade determined by accountability evaluation. 
Performance evaluations include achievement evaluation and competency 
evaluation. As an evaluation method, MBO is used. Based on the results of a 
performance evaluation, a pay raise (shōkyū) is decided, and the cumulative 
result is reflected in a promotion (shōkyū) of grade (Ishida 2006). 
First, in achievement evaluation (performance evaluation in the narrow 
sense), the criterion is accountability. Based on accountability, expected 
performance is defined as an objective. Setting the objective of accountability 
and evaluating whether it has been achieved is at the core of an evaluation. 
Next, a competency evaluation assesses the conduct of the person in charge of a 
particular area of accountability. According to the accountability grade, 
expected behavior is derived from the behavioral characteristics of outstanding 
performers, and the level of expected behavior is presented as the objective. The 
actual behavior of the person in charge of the accountability area is evaluated 
based on the behavioral characteristics presented as the objective. In competency 
evaluations, performance behavior, including behavior as a process, is evaluated. 
The assessment of ability elements in competency evaluation is not based on 
potential ability but on explicit (kenzaiteki) ability. 
Table 4. Pay raise table for an accountability ranking system (model) 
Evaluation
Zone  S A B C
Zone 4 0 - -- ---
Zone 3 + 0 - --
Zone 2 ++ + 0 -
Zone 1 +++ ++ + 0
Note: The policy line is between Zone 2 and Zone 3.
Source:  Nishimura (2016, 25). The numerical notation of the zone classification is 
modified to match table 3. 
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As such, under the accountability ranking system, levels of expected per- 
formance and expected behavior are proposed as objectives based on accounta- 
bility grades, and performance (achievement) and behavior are evaluated 
against a proposed objective. Competency assessments that consider not only 
short-term performance but also behaviors including processes are prevalent. In 
the first half of the 2000s, the concept of competency was introduced in Japanese 
companies in order to provide solid indications of job performance behaviors, 
resulting in the institutionalization of competency evaluations. As shown in 
figure 2, performance as an output is more closely related to behavior or process 
than job execution ability as an input. 
Table 5 shows the introduction rate of achievement evaluation in Japanese 
companies. It is not merely a direct performance assessment of the accountability 
ranking system, but also an indirect indicator of the introduction rate of per- 
formance evaluation that is a key element of performance-based wages. In large 
enterprises with more than 1,000 employees, the trend is downward. It was 86.1 
percent in 2004, 83.3 percent in 2010, and 70.1 percent in 2012. However, the 
achievement evaluation system has been introduced in about seventy percent of 
such companies. It can be seen that achievement evaluations are common in 
large corporations.  
4. Main Characteristics
As seen so far, under accountability-based pay arrangements, the concept of 
accountability in place of conventional job execution ability is becoming a key 
concept in the personnel and wage system. It is a wage system that measures the 





















2012 36.3(70.1) 100.0(100.0) 24.8(25.4) 46.0(50.7) 20.5(15.4) 1.3(0.6) 7.3(7.7)
2010 45.1(83.3) 100.0(100.0) 23.0(21.2) 42.2(52.3) 23.6(20.9) 3.1(0.7) 8.1(4.9)
2004 62.8(86.1) 100.0(100.0) 15.9(16.4) 45.3(56.6) 30.4(22.4) 0.9(0.9) 7.1(3.7)
Note:  Figures in parentheses are the ratio of firms adopting the achievement evaluation 
system in companies with more than 1,000 employees.
Source: Kōsei Rōdōshō (annually).
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scale of accountability by paying attention to the split work of each position in 
terms of its contribution to the value added in business management, and sets 
accountability grades to reflect that in wages. The main features of the account- 
ability ranking system and accountability-based pay are as follows (see table 1). 
First, the accountability grade, which is designed on the demand side of the 
labor force, has characteristics that reflect the market and value added. There- 
fore, it has the main features of performance-based personnel management, 
unlike job competence pay, which focuses on the supply side. Personnel man- 
agement based on accountability grades is designed and operated in such a way 
that a performance-based system is implemented as well. It evaluates not only 
short-term achievements but also performance behaviors, and explicit (kenzaiteki) 
competence is evaluated as an ability factor in competency evaluations. 
Second, pay for accountability system features an institutional mechanism to 
prevent automatic pay increases. The pay raise table is designed so that the 
average wage per zone converges on the policy line, even when pay raises are 
possible within the grade, not to mention the type of fixed amount per grade. 
Within each accountability grade, the ratio of the total amount of pay cut to the 
total amount of a pay raise is the same. It also has the characteristic of the per- 
formance-based pay in terms of revising conventional, seniority-based remuner- 
ation. Additionally, the pay raise system that disables automatic pay increases 
works as an incentive for employees to not remain in the same grade and 
facilitates grade promotion. This is because, in order to earn wages above the 
same grade, it is essential to earn accountability grade promotions. This requires 
excellent results in accountability evaluations. 
Third, accountability-based pay is a wage system that emphasizes the 
demand side of labor, but unlike job-based pay, it understands the accountability 
of split work by person-standard. The division of work, which is characterized 
by ambiguous job classifications and indefinite characteristics of work assign- 
ments, inherits the same characteristics under the job competence qualification 
system, and in this respect it is a person-based wage system. The accountability 
evaluation for the work (tasks) assigned to a position must also ultimately be an 
individual evaluation. In accountability-based pay, both accountability evaluations 
and performance evaluations have the characteristics of individual evaluations. 
Fourth, Japan’s accountability-based pay, while taking Hay System of Job 
Evaluation as a reference, has the feature of prioritizing accountability as per- 
formance accountability that can contribute to business profit through taking 
only accountability as behavior/performance, one of the three main factors of 
job evaluation, without going through comprehensive job analyses and job 
evaluations. Originally, the Hay System attached the scale of accountability to 
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jobs, which were evaluated comprehensively together with knowledge, 
experience (know-how), and problem solving (problem-solving ability) as 
elements of job evaluations. With job-based pay as its premise, behavior/
performance (accountability) is measured in terms of what kind of performance 
can be expected of a job. Conversely, Japan’s role-based pay system, which does 
not assume job-based pay, evaluates mainly role accountability and performance 
accountability, and there is a possibility of excessive bias toward performance-
based systems depending on its operation (Kinoshita 1999, 77-80; 2014, 28-30).   
Conclusion: Summary and Prospects
This paper examines recent changes in the Japanese wage system, focusing on 
pay for accountability, which is a representative wage system newly implemented 
in Japan due to the introduction of the performance-based system. The results 
of this study are summarized as follows. 
First, following the collapse of the bubble economy, changes in the wage 
system due to the introduction of performance-based personnel policies has 
been centered on the transition from job competence pay to accountability-
based pay in large Japanese corporations. Although it is not included in the 
scope of this paper, job-based pay, introduced as a new wage system alongside 
accountability-based pay, presumes the traditional Japanese-style split of work 
as shown in the typical example of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company (Kinoshita 
1999; Ishida 2006). So-called Japanese-style job-based pay is virtually identical 
to accountability-based pay, while it is essentially different from the pay for jobs 
in Europe and America. In this sense, “seniority wage → job competence pay → 
pay for accountability” can be said to be the order of change in the postwar 
wage system. 
Second, accountability grades and accountability-based pay, which are 
designed on the demand side of the labor force, have characteristics that reflect 
the market and value added. They therefore have the major features of 
performance-based personnel management, unlike the job competence pay, 
which is based on the supply side. Performance evaluations are institutionalized 
and pay raise tables are designed and operated so that automatic pay raises can 
be excluded.  
Third, under pay for accountability arrangements, the split of work is not 
based on a job that is to be clearly defined and divided. Work that belongs to 
multiple job classes are flexibly assigned at the task level to a worker in charge of 
certain positions. It is a wage system involving a person-standard in that it has 
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no choice but to grasp the task on the basis of person (worker) as in job 
competence pay. Both accountability-based pay and job-based pay (Japanese-
style job-based pay) are qualitatively different from the pay for jobs in the West. 
The most important characteristic of the recent wage system change is that wage 
arrangements are based on demand and emphasize the market and value added, 
but a person-standard wage is also retained. In this paper, the formation of 
accountability-based pay as a person-based wage was systematically investigated 
in relation to the characteristics of split of work in the Japanese workplace.  
As seen from the experience of Japanese wage system reform, it is difficult to 
maintain the seniority wage or seniority-prone job competence pay in response 
to environmental changes such as the global intensification of international 
competition and the progress of the IT industry. The shift to a demand-driven 
personnel and wage system was inevitable. The transition from a supply-
oriented wage system, such as seniority-based pay or job competence pay, to a 
job-based wage system is also considered irreversible. The accountability-based 
wage system, which is a Japanese wage system based on the reality of a division 
of work with vague boundaries, can contribute to restraining and alleviating 
seniority wages as a demand-oriented wage system. Considering that flexible 
work assignments are dominant in Korean companies, where a seniority wage is 
still prevalent, it is likely that performance-based personnel management will go 
beyond a performance-based annual salary system and lead to wage system 
reform resembling that of Japanese accountability-based wages.   
However, will pay for accountability be sustainable as a stable wage system 
in the mid to long term? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to in- 
vestigate further the functions of Japanese-style job-based pay and role-based pay 
during the passage of time. Hence, in this paper, the problems of accountability-
based pay as a wage involving a person-standard are highlighted first. 
First, as flexibility and the indefinite characteristics of work assignments are 
maintained under accountability-based pay, it is difficult to obtain the objective 
or convincing power of evaluation compared to that of US-style pay for a job. In 
particular, there is a problem that role accountability and performance account- 
ability are evaluated mainly without a basis for comprehensive job analysis and 
evaluation. Therefore, employees engaging in tasks in which achieving direct 
results is difficult, or in which typical tasks are ranked at the bottom of account- 
ability grades, and if performance evaluations are conducted based on them, the 
results will invariably be poor. This will increase the possibility of the polari- 
zation of remuneration between upper and lower grades (Kinoshita 2014, 31).6
6. The problem of such personnel evaluations can be confirmed by government statistics. 
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Next, the ease of position changes or accountability (role) reorganization 
following the results of performance evaluations or management strategy is an 
advantage of the accountability-based pay, but it makes it difficult to secure 
wage stability due to fluctuations in wages. Particularly, if accountability is 
reorganized due to changes of management strategy, even if a position is still the 
same, accountability-based pay for it may increase or decrease. If accountability-
based pay, which is the base wage, becomes volatile, it can make it difficult for 
employees to plan their futures and erode motivation. 
This problem arises from the fact that under pay for accountability arrange- 
ments, accountability is not understood in the job, which renders impossible the 
removal of ambiguity. Although the relationship between wages and work (jobs) 
is becoming increasingly intimate, it still suffers essentially the same problems as 
person-based wages such as job competence pay or a seniority wage. This 
problem suggests that Japanese wage system reforms will ultimately need to 
progress to job-based wages. As shown by the performance-based personnel 
system in the US, it is necessary to establish pay for the job based on a job 
analysis system. Only when performance-based personnel management is added 
on the premise of such job-based wages will it finally become a sustainable wage 
system. In particular, as the proportion of part-time employees in the workforce 
is increasing, it is necessary to set job-based wages as a priority in order to 
realize the concept of equal value labor = equal pay, which is indispensable for 
reducing income gaps and ensuring the fairness of wages.7 In this regard, pay for 
accountability or Japanese-style job-based pay has the character of a transitional 
wage to form a job-based wage. In order to truly change the accountability-
based pay into a job-based wage, it is essential to raise awareness of employment 
stakeholders of the necessity and utility of a job-based wage and to improve 
social conditions. The age-wage curve with an upward trend, which has the 
characteristics of a living wage, exists for a reason. In order to abolish this, the 
level of job-based pay should be enough to live on at its minimum. If this is not 
possible, system reform to bring about the socialization of education expenses 
or housing rights must take place. 
According to a 2010 survey on the achievement evaluation system, the most recent survey (of 
companies with more than 1,000 employees), 50.5 percent of respondents said “there is a problem.” 
Specific problems existed in the order of a “lack of convincing evaluation results” (33.1 percent), a 
“lack of convincing evaluation system” (22.6 percent), and a “loss of motivation” (19.7 percent) 
(Kōsei Rōdōshō, annually). 
7. The study of Endō (2005, 2016) encourages job-based pay from this perspective and suggests 
specific guidelines for implementation. However, in its discussion, there is a problem of classifying 
role-based or “job-based pay” (Japanese-style job-based pay) analyzed in this paper as job-based 
wages. 
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